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CHECKS.
LIABILITY OF DRAWER OF CHECKS..
The drawer of a check directs the bank upon which it is
drawn, to pay the amount named in it, to the payee or his order.
But, from this direction to pay, is implied a promise by him, to
pay from some other fund, if the bank fails to pay. A personal
action may therefore be maintained by the holder who has not
obtained payment from the bank, against the maker'. The hol-
der may be the endorsee of the payee2 or the payee himself3 .
If the plaintiff is endorsee, his statement should aver owner-
ship4 . The maker of the check having assigned for the benefit
of creditors, the holder may claim a dividend upon it from the
assets.5
NECESSITY OF DEMAND ON THE BANK.
It is frequently said or assumed that the holder cannot re-
cover from the drawer of a check, without proving an unsuc-
cessful demand upon the bank and notice thereof, betimes to the
drawer'. Presentment must be on the day of maturity if the
'Markley V. Quay, 8W. N. C. 145; Doherty v. Watson 1) V. N. 32;
B. & C. R. R. v. Wilkins, 10 C. C. 269.
2Walker v. Geise, 4 Wh. 252; Rogers v. Dunn, 172 Pa. 151; Laber v.
Steppacker, 103 Pa. 81; Pierce v. Daniel, 16 W. N. 35; Case v. Morris, 31
Pa. 100; Bank v. Kopitsch Co. 101 Pa. 134.
3Freeman v. Baras, 31 Super. 84; Uhler v. Sanderson, 38 Pa. 12.
'Penn Bank's Estate, 165 Pa. 548.
5Bank v. Kopitsch Co., 161 Pa. 134. It is mysteriously said by Williams
J. that the statement should aver "presentment and demand."
6Lawson v. Richardson, (; Phila. 179: Levy v. Peters, 9 S. & R. 125;
Ackerman v. Dornan, 2 Leg. Rec. 345.
(141)
142 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
check is post-dated, or is made payable at a future day, and
not on the third day after, grace not having been allowed in the
case of checks, even when allowed in the case of bills of ex-
change and promissory notes'.
But it is understood that a failure to make demand on the
bank, on the day of the maturity of the check, if payable at a
future time, or within a reasonable time after its issue, in any
case, will not be an obstacle to a recovery against the drawer,
unless, during the period of delay, the bank has become insol-
vent, and either the holder of the check or its drawer must
therefore lose8 and the burden of showing such insolvency seems
to be upon the drawer; not that of showing solvency upon the
holder9 . If the drawer is shown not to have had any effects in
the bank, when the check was drawn, nor since; that presentment
to the bank would have been of no use and notice of non-pay-
ment of no use to the drawer, proof of them is unessential"' .
Proof that the drawer had stopped payment, would likewise dis-
pense with demand on the bank and notice to the drawer".
But, an indebtedness of the drawer to the bank, on a note not
yet due, is no excuse for not presenting the check in a reason-
able time".
EVIDENCE OF THE DEMAND AND NOTICE.
The act of January 2d, 1815, provides that the official acts,
protests and attestations of all notaries public certified under
their hands and seals of office may be read as evidence of the
facts certified. This act is not so far modified by that of Dec.
14th, 1854, as to confine the evidential value of the certificate, to
cases of the dishonor of bills and promissory notes. The certif-
icate of a notary, acting by the authority of Pennsylvania, of
the protest of a check drawn on a bank, is evidence of a demand
7Champion v. Gordon 70 Pa. 474; Sterrett v. Rosencrantz 3 Phila. 54;
Woodward v. McClung 1 Phila. 176.
$Fleming v. Denny, 2 Phila. 111, Sharswood J.
9Barclay v. Pursley, 110 Pa. 13; Rogers v. Dunn, 172 Pa. 151.
"Case v. Morris, 31 Pa. 100. If the drawer has funds but .not enough
to pay the check, in the bank, he is not entitled that demand be made on
the bank; Sterrett v. Rosecrantz, 3 Phila. 54.
"Flemming v. Denny, 2 Phila. 111. Proof was made of demand on the
bank, and of its refusal to pay because of notice from the drawer not to pay,
in Edgell v. McLaughlin, 6 Wh 176.
12Case v. Morris, 31 Pa. 100.
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and notice.'" Other proof however, of the demand on the bank,
and of notice to the drawer of its refusal to pay, is admissible.
The 118th section of the act concerning negotiable instruments
provides that protest is not required except in the case of foreign
bills of exchange'. When the notary states that the demand
was made of a clerk of the bank competent to make answer,
this is prima facie evidence that the person on whom demand
was made was a clerk empowered to make answer for the bank."
DELAY CAUSES NO LOSS.
A delay, however long, in demanding the money from the
bank upon the check, will be no defense for the drawer if no
loss is caused to him by it; i. e. a delay of five months.'" If the
check has been endorsed to a bonafide purchaser for value, the
failure of consideration for it, is no defense. A delay of four
days in presenting the check to the bank, will be no defense,
for the drawer, who has notified the bank not to pay, although
he alleges that, had the check been presented promptly, he
would have been able to recover its amount from the payee inas-
much as he had further dealings with him. The loss is too re-
mote".
WAIVER OF DEMAND.
If a drawer, notwithstanding non-demand on the bank, or
non-notice of the bank's refusal to pay, makes partial payment
of the check, he can be compelled to pay the residue. His act
of paying is a waiver. It is evidence that the drawer knows
that due diligence has been used, or that, notwithstanding, he
18is still under an obligation to pay' .
TIME ALLOWED FOR PRESENTMENT.
Presentment to the bank, the instant the check is received,
is impracticable. Some time must elapse after receipt, before
-payment of it can be demanded. Should the bank fail before
"3Lawson v. Richards, 6 Phila. 179 (Sharswood J.) Neeley v. Merrick, 7
Phila. 17o; Union Safe Deposit Bank v. Strauch, 20 Super, x96 Champion
v. Gordon, 7o Pa. 474.
'4Wisner v. First Nat. Bank, 220 Pa. 21.
5Woodward v. McClung, i Phila. 176.
'6Fleming v. Denny, 2 Phila. ii. Claim against a decedent's estate
on a check given two years before his death, and never presented; Ritchie
v. Deposit & Trust Co., 189 Pa. 410.
"Pierce v. Danielsi 16 W. N. C. 35.
'8Levy v. Peters, 9 S. & R. 125.
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the presentment and before the expiration of this time the holder
will not be prevented from recovering from the drawer. The loss
will fall on the latter. When the payee of the check and the
drawee bank, are residents of the same city, the holder
should present the check to the bank on the day on which
it is received, if received before the close of banking hours,
or on the next day. If it is not so presented, within that time,
and the bank fails before it is presented, the holder must bear
the loss. A check delivered in Philadelphia May 26th, 1885,
was not presented to the drawee bank in the same city, until
May 29th. If the check had been presented at any time prior
to the 29th it would have been paid. The holder could not re-
cover from the drawer'9 . If a check is received after banking
hours, it may be treated as if received the following day. In a
city like Philadelphia, where there are clearing houses checks
are ordinarily collected through banks. Checks deposited for
collection are presented for payment on the next succeeding
business day. If the check was delivered after banking hours,
it may the next day, be put in a bank for collection. That bank
may wait until the next day, before presenting it for payment
to the drawee bank. If, on that day, the check is presented, but
payment is declined, because the bank, the same day, stops busi-
iness, the loss will not fall upon the holder"1 . A check, drawn
in Philadelphia upon a bank there, was presented the next day
at 10 a. m., but the bank had closed its doors. The drawer was
liable to the payee although had the check been presented for
payment on the day on which it was delivered, it would have
been paid by the bank.2 A drew in Philadelphia a check upon
a bank there, May 5th, 1891, and delivered it to the agent of
19Nat. State Bank v. Weil, 242 Pa. 457.
I'Loux v. Fox, 171 Pa. 68; Willis v. Finley, 173 Pa. 28. If the drawer
fails to pay the check, he is liable on the obligation the check was given to
discharge. The check, received after banking hours, May 6th, was depos
ited in the holder's bank for collection May 7th. After half past eleven
o'clock, May 8th, demand for payment was made. The bank had failed
shortly before, that morning.
22Doherty v. Watson, 19 W. N. 32. A check drawn Dec. 4th, 1841 is
not presented for payment until Jan. 24, 1842 when the bank has failed.
The drawer is not liable, if, had the check been presented in proper time,
it would have been paid, or at least, if not paid, and notice given to the
drawer, he would have been able to obtain some money or security from
the bank; Case v. Morris, 31 Pa. 100.,
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the payee, doing business in New York. The agent returned to
New York on the afternoon of that day, after the close of bank-
ing hours. The next day the check was put in a New York
bank for collection. The bank sent it to its Philadelphia cor-
respondent on May 7th. It was received and presented by this
correspondent at the drawee bank for payment about noon of
May 8th, but the latter bank had closed its doors. It was held
as matter of law that there was due diligence'. A delay on
the part of the post office io not to be imputed to the holder of
the check or draft. He is entitled to a reasonable time to pre-
sent it. What is such reasonable time will depend on circum-
stances. A put a draft upon J. Cooke & Co. bankers, into the
hands of the School Directors of Muncy borough prior to Sept.
13th, 1873. It was sent to Philadelphia by the directors between
Sept. 13th and Sept. 20th. Cooke & Co. suspended Sept. 18th.
The directors were not to be charged with the loss of the draft,
because there was no unreasonable delay ' . It is said that the
facts being ascertained, whether a check has been presented in
due time, so as to continue the original liability of the drawer,
endorser, etc., of the check, is a question to be decided by the
Court.
NEGLIGENCE OF COLLECTING BANK.
The drawer of a check upon a bank at New Milford, Pa.,
will not be liable to the payee if the latter depositing it in a bank
for collection, that bank sends it to another at a distant point,
which sends it direct to the drawee bank, and if the drawee bank,
does not pay it, but lays it aside, neither charging it to the ac-
count of the drawer, nor protesting it, nor sending it or the
amount of it to the intermediate or primary collecting bank,
and if the drawee bank two months after it receives the check,
becomes insolvent making an assignment for the benefit of
23Rosenthal v. Ehlricher, 154 Pa. 390. The holder recovered from the
maker. In Nat. State Bank v. Weil, 141 Pa. 457, the rule is laid down that
when the check is payable at a different place from that at which it is ne-
gotiated, it should be forwarded by mail on the same or the next succeed-
ing day for presentment. In 154 Pa. 396, the check was delivered in the
city where the drawee bank was, and thence carried to New York, and
thence sent back to Philadelphia.24Muncy Borough School District v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 469. Man-
damus to compel the school directors to deliver bonds to persons who, in
payment of them, had sent the draft.
25Loud v. Fox, 171 Pa. 68; Rosenthal v. Ehrlicher, 154 Pa. 399.
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creditors. It is negligence to send a check for payment to
the bank upon which it is drawn and if, in consequence the
check is not paid, when, had it been sent to another to collect,
it would have been paid the negligence of the collecting:
bank will be imputed to the holder. 6
LOSS OTHERWISE THAN BY FAILURE OF BANK.
A loss may arise from the non-presentment of a check within
a due time otherwise than by the failure of the bank. The
drawer may after such undue time stop the payment of the check;
or the bank holding notes of the drawer which mature after the
expiration of such due time, may apply the deposit to those
notes. These acts would be no defense to the drawer of the
check, but they may discharge one who is a security for him.
Check drawn by A May 27, 1874. The payee omits to present it
until June 4th, 1874, although the bank and all the parties are
in Philadelphia. On June 4th before the presentment of the
check, the bank applied the drawer's deposit to a note of the
drawer which then became due. The surety for the debt for
which the check was drawn, was thus discharged. A check, it
is said, is generally intended for immediate payment; not for
circulation". A, purchasing land covered by a mortgage,
the vendor puts a part of the purchase money into the hands of
the conveyancer X,in order that he may pay it to the mortagee
and thus obtain a release from the mortgage of the premises
bought, and X draws a check for the amount which the mort-
gagee fails to present for payment for three months, when X~s
account with the bank becomes worthless, although for two
months after it was drawn, the check would have been paid,
if presented. The mortgagee must as respects the purchaser of
the land, be regarded as paidz.
PAYMENT TO WRONG PERSON.
If a check payable to B, is delivered, without B's authority
to his bookkeeper, who forges B's endorsement and thus ob-
tains the money, B (in the absence of negligence, etc.) may
maintain an action upon this check against the drawer 9.
26Wagner v. Crook, 167 Pa. 259. If more than two months after the
check was sent to the drawee bank, the payee, thinking it lost, obtains a
duplicate from the drawer, but two days before the drawee bank fails, the
duplication does not condone the previous negligence.
27Fegley v. McDonald 89 Pa. 128.
2Kilpatrick v. B. & L. Assn. i i9 Pa. 30,
2Ashbridge v. Allen, I W.N. 116.
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CHECK AN EXECUTED GIFT.
If the check is a means of effecting an executed gift the
donee (payee) may enforce payment of it against the donor, or
the estate of the donor he having died. If the person who be-
comes administrator of the donor, is the donee, on settling his
account, he will be entitled to a credit for this amounts' .
DEATH OF DRAWER.
The drawer's death before the payment of the check, al-
though it acts as a revocation of the check, as an order on the
bank, does not destroy the liability upon it incurred by the
drawer, in issuing it. A claim on such check may be allowed
from the estate' .
DEFENCES AVAILABLE TO DRAWER AS AGAINST PAYEE.
The drawer may set up, generally, any defence, as against
the payee, that would be available, had the contract taken any
other form; want of consideration, failure of consideration. A
check, not under seal, intended to be the instrument of a gift
of the money called for by it, is not enforceable. Afortiori is
this true, if the check calls for payment six months after the
drawer's death. and it is not delivered to the payee". That the
consideration is bad and the check was improperly obtained, is
a defences. The evidence may show an ample consideration
for the check. The check being, e. g. for $2500 payable to B,
it may be shown that B furnished board, room and personal at-
tendance to the drawer during his prolonged sickness and intox-
ication ' . The check being given for the feeding of the draw-
er's hogs, under the plea of payment with leave, etc., the de-
fence of an overcharge in plaintiff's bill, of the furnishing to the
hogs of inferior grain, etc. may be made . The drawer of a
check post-dated, cannot set up an agreement that if he desired,
when the check matured, it might be paid by the drawer's note
at four months, such agreement contradicting the check".
3°Ruffels' Estate, 1.54 Pa. 183.
31Nagle's Estate, 134 Pa. 31. As to liability of the bank after death of
drawer, see Bromley v. Nat. Bank, 9 Phila. 522.
32Appeal of Waynesburg College, 111 Pa. 130.
3Laber v. Steppacher, 103 Pa. 81.
34Ritchie v. Deposit & Trust Co. 189 Pa. 410.
3Uhler v. Sanderson 38 Pa. 128.
3
6Hill v. Gaw, 4 Pa. 493; Appel v. Greenawald, 2 W. N. 395. But Cf.
Rafferty vs. Masonic Bank, 4 Sadler 71, as to contradicting a check.
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The check being for the price of a horse, a breach of the ac-
31companying warranty may be set up in defence
DEFENCE. ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION.
An ancient act of assembly forbids that any person shall
contribute any money to make up a purse to be run, raced or
trotted for and penalizes such contribution by a fine of $30. A
check given to an agricultural society in order to enable the
maker to enter his horses for a race the winner in which receives
a premium from the fund raised by such contributions, is given
for an illegal object, and no recovery can be had upon it . A
and B bet each $500 on the existence or non-existence of a cer-
tain paper. Each drew checks for that sum, placing it in the
hands of another. A's check then came to the hands of B, the
winner. He suing A, the court held that the action could not
be maintained. Though bets were recoverable by the common
law of England, they are not in Pennsylvania, apparently, how-
ever, not more because betting is injurious to a government,
than because the judges revolt at being obliged to decide frivo-
lous and gratuitous contests39. Fabel, a stock broker, received
from Bauer a deposit of $2000 to cover margins. Profits were
made in the various dealings for Bauer, to the extent of $1262.50.
In settlement between them Fabel gave to Bauer a check for
$3262.50. Upon this check Bauer was allowed by the trial
court to recover the deposit, not the profit. Fabel bought the
stocks through a third person to whom he transferred the de-
posit, and from whom he received back the deposit and the
profits, $1262.50. "It is at least doubtful" says the court,
"whether he (Fabel) should not have been regarded as an agent
who had received money for his principal and could not avoid
liability by setting up the illegality of the transaction from which
the money came." At all events the transaction in which the
deposit had been made, was closed, and the deposit could be re-
covered back". If A discounts B's notes, on Sunday, giving
to B his check for the amount less the discount, and this check
is presented to the bank on a secular day and the money ob-
tained on it, and if A, sucing later on the notes, is defeated by
the defence that the transaction was on Sunday, he may recover
3TBank v Broadhead, 2 Kulp 285.
3 Comley v. Hillegas 94 Pa. 132.
39Edgell v. McLaughlin, 6 Wh. 176.
40Bauer v. Fabel, 221 Pa. 156.
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back the money obtained by B upon his check, although the
check was likewise given on Sunday. When the holder, says
Mitchell J,, presented the check, on a weekday, and obtained
payment of it he ratified the transaction "with all its conse-
quences." Contracts made on Sunday are not void. They
may be validated by ratification. Hence, infers the court, there
could be a recovery back by the maker of the check, of the
money secured upon it. It likewise says that there could be no
recovery upon the notes. If the obtaining the money on the
check, on Wednesday "ratified and reaffirmed the transaction
with all its consequences" how could the drawer of the check
goet back the money paid on it? How could the notes, which
were a part of the transaction, remain invalid? The truth is
that the action by the drawer against the holder of the check,
for the money procured upon it, proceded, not on the theory
that the check was validated by the payment, but that- it was
void41.
DEFENCE AVAILABLE, AS AGAINST ENDORSEE.
A bona fide endorsee for value of a check, is not exposed
to various defences that would be available against the payee,
e. g., failure of consideration,42 breach of warranty, *' that the
check was made for the accommodation of the payee.'3 A has
a deposit in bank and draws it out, receiving for it the cashier's
check. The deposit actually belongs to X, and A has no right,
as against X, to withdraw it. Nevertheless the bank would be
compelled to pay its cashier's check to a purchaser of it for
value. Hence, it could not be bound to pay the deposit to X."
The treasurer of a beneficial society gives its check to its attor-
ney, who later endorses it. The society subsequently notifies
him to pay no money to anybody without its consent. This re-
vocation of the check is invalid as against the endorsee.
5
To an action by the endorsee of a check against the drawer;
who has stopped payment, the defense is sufficient that the
check was made payable to X in order that X should pay a debt
41Cook v. Forker, 193 Pa. 461.
412Walker v. Heisse, 4 Wh. 252.
42,Banks v. Broadhead, 2 Kulp 186.
43Rbgers v. Dunn, 172 Pa. 151.
"4Penn Bank v. Frankish, 91 Pa. 33S. In suit by X the burden is upon
him to show that the endorsee of the check was not such for value.
45Laber v. Steppacher, 103 Pa. 81.
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of the drawer; that X neglected to pay the check to the creditor
for some time; that meanwhile, the drawer discovered that X
was insolvent, and that therefore there was danger of misappro-
priation of the money if he got it on the check, and that the
plaintiff had sufficient notice of these facts before he purchased
the check. On an affidavit of defence alleging these facts, the
court refused to enter judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit."
ILLEGAL CONSIDERATIONS.
When a check is given to a stake holder, to be delivered
to a payee, if he should be the winner in a bet, and before the
decision of the bet the payee obtains this check and endorses it
to a bonafide purchaser, for value, such purchaser cannot com-
pel payment of it from the drawer. The bet was between A
and B as to whether B had been in Tunkhannock on a certain
day. A was to be the winner if B had been there, at that time.
A's check for the stakes was put in the hands of a stake holder
who however, allowed B to get possession of it before the de-
cision of the fact on the mode agreed upon. B endorsed it to
another".
LOST CHECK.
If at the request of the creditor the debtor sends the former
by mail a check for the amount of the debt, and the check is
lost, and on notice thereof the drawer stops payment, there is
still a possibility that the check has been endorsed, and in the
hands of a person who can compel the drawer to pay it. The
drawer therefore has a right to demand indemnity against the
possible necessity of paying the holder of the check, before he
shall be compelled to pay the debt to the creditor. If a few
days after obtaining notice of the loss of the check, the debtor
offers to pay the debt, if the creditor signs a statement that le
had never received the check, nor, after due dilligence, been
able to obtain information concerning it, and the creditor refuses,
he cannot recover in a suit for the debt brought nearly five
years afterwards. At all events, the affidavit of defence alleg-
4"Keller vs. Downey Bro. 14 Lanc. 117.
4
7Durr v. Barclay, 8 C. C. 285. The payee could not have recovered;
Edgell v. McLaughlin, 6 Whart, 176.
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ing these facts, the court will not enter judgment for want of a
sufficient affidavit"8 .
MATTERS NOT EXPOSING TO DEFENCES.
One who receives an endorsement of a post-dated check be-
fore the day of the date does not expose himself to defences that
would not be valid as against the ordinary endorser for value".
An undue retention of a check without presentation to the bank
may cast discredit upon it, and expose the endorser to the draw-
er's defence against the payee. A check was drawn and de-
livered on Tuesday or Wednesday. The drawer said he had no
money in bank then and requested the payee to hold it until the
following Monday. Two or three days after its date, that is on
Friday, it was endorsed. A few hours after the endorsement,
the treasurer of the drawee was notified by the society not to
pay the check. This delay in presentation of the check was not
sufficient to put the endorsee upon inquiry ° . A check delivered
Friday was deposited in bank eodem die. Saturday and Sunday
were legal holidays. On Monday the bank returned the check
to the endorsee who had deposited it, because the maker had
notified it not to pay the check. This delay did not expose the
holder to the defence of failure of consideration"1 . A check over
a year old, is overdue, and one who takes it, takes it subject to
the defense that it has been paid52. A failure of consideration,
between the drawer and the payee cannot affect the endorsee .
The fact that a check was endorsed gratuitously to A, is no de-
fence against B. who bought it from A for value, although he
knew that A was a mere donee, so far as the creditors of the
maker are concerned, unless B knew of the insolvency of the
4Barclay v. Lehigh Coal, etc Co., 33 Super. 214. Some of the authori-
ties cited do not require the tender of indemnity to precede the bringing of
the action but are content if such tender is made before judgment.
4Walker v. Heisse, 4 Wh. 252; An endorsement 8 days before the date
of the check; Rogers v. Dunn 172 Pa. 151.
5 Laber v. Steppacher, 103 Pa. 81.
51Matthews v. Foederer, 19 Phila. 295.
52Lancaster Bank v. Woodward 18 Pa. 357. The check had been paid
before it came due.
-3Piece v. Daniel, 16 W. N. 35; Stedman v. Carstairs, 97 Pa. 235; Mat-
thews v. Foederer 19 Phila. 295 (check was given in exchange for another
payment of which had been stopped.)
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maker54 . That A, the drawer, is treasurer of a society, which,
before the check (post-dated) becomes payable, notifies him
not to pay, will be no defence as against a holder, for the value
of the check".
HOLDER FOR VALUE.
A transfer in payment of a pre-existing debt, is for value".
Thus, if B takes from A by endorsement a check in payment"7;
if A and B exchange checks, A, in good faith, and B's check
being later dishonored, B transfers a check of C to A in satis-
faction A is a holder for value58.
Receiving a check as collateral security was not, prior to
1901 a receiving for value59. The 25th section of the act
of May 16th, 1901, P. L. 194, 199, enacts that "Value is any
consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. An ante-
cedent or preexisting debt constitutes value, and is deemed such
whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future
time." It evidently intends that reception of a negotiable instru-
ment as collateral security no less than as payment, shall consti-
tute the party so receiving, a holder for value. A, transferee
of a check (e.g. a bank) for the purpose of collection is not a
purchaser for value. Defences available against the payee (e. g.
breach of warranty of the horse for the price of which
the check was given) are available against such transferee.i0
There is a presumption that the holder of a check is a holder
for value.
SIGNATURE OF MAKER.
A check signed David Pursley, Sr., is primafacie the check
of Pursley. If parol evidence is admitted that he signed as
foreman of John Ardell, the plaintiff may furnish parol evidence
that he did not so sign, but that his intention was that the check
should bind himself". In a suit on a check signed M. S. Quay,
Chairman, Quay could show that he had signed for the Repiub-
54Fulweiler v. Hughes, 17 Pa. 440.
5Laber v. Steppacher, 103 Pa. 81.
• 6Walker v. Heisse, 4 Wh. 252. Penn Bank v. Frankish, 91 Pa. 339.
574 Wh. 252.
5Steadman v. Carstairs, 97 Pa, 235.
•5 Walker v. Heisse, 4 Wh. 252, Penn Bank v. Frankish, 91 Pa. 339.
OBanks v. Broadhead 2 Kulp, 285.
6'Bromley v. Nat. Bank, 9 Phila. 522.
62Barclay v. Pursley, i o Pa. 13.
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lican State Central Committee, and thus escape a personal and
sole liability, if the plaintiff were the payee. The evidence, it
is said by Thayer, P. J., would, as against an endorsee, be in-
admissible'. In a suit by the payee against Walter P. Wilkins,
upon a check signed Walter P. Wilkins, Pres., defendant offered
to show that he was president of a Limited Partnership Associ-
ation organized under the act of June 2d, 1874. Since the 3d
section of this act requires the full name of the association to be
set forth in checks, etc., and since this check did not set forth
the full name, Wilkins was personally liable".
STOPPING PAYMENT.
A check is a draft or order upon a bank for the payment of
money. Until, however, it is accepted in form or virtually, the
bank is under no duty to the payee or holder of the check. Its
obligation is towards the depositor only. The depositor may
change his mind and, before presentment of the check for pay-
ment, may revoke it. This he may do, without notice to the
holder, by notice to the bank, not to pay the check'. After.ac-
ceptance of the check by the bank, even though the drawer has
no knowledge of it he cannot stop payment without the bank's
acquiescence. As the bank will be liable upon its acceptance it
doubtless could hold the drawer liable for its reimbursement."
POST-DATED CHECKS.
Checks are ordinarily payable on demand. Says the. 185th
section of the act relating to negotiable instruments, P. L 194,
219. "A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank, payable
on demand. Except as herein otherwise provided, the provis-
ions of this act applicable to a bill of exchange, payable on de-
6Markley v. Quay, 8 W. N. 145.
6B. & 0. R. R. v. Wilkins, io Pa. C.C. 269.
65German N. Bank v. Farmers' D. N. Bank, 118 Pa. 294. Cf. Flemm-
ing v. Denny, 2 Phila 161 where Sharwood J. said that a check was an ap-
propriation of the payee, of the money on deposit. If a property owner,
against whose property there is a lein for paving, after giving a check for
a part of the claim stops payment of it the claim can be enforced by sere
facies. Richmond Granite Co. v. Kelly, 2 W. N. 396. But the giving of
the check does not preclude a defence based on the imperfect character of
the work done.
'Farmer's Bank v. Elizabethtown Bank 30 Super. 271. In Uhler v"
Sanderson, 38 Pa. 128, judgment was stopped because of a discovery that
the payee was not entitled to the money, because of a breach of the con-
tract: e. g. he had fed inferior grain to the drawer's hogs, etc.
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mand, apply to a check." A check however, may, without los-
ing negotiability, be made payable at a future time" . It may
do this by bearing a future date68 orby being made expressly pay-
able at a future time. A check e.g., drawn Nov. 4th may be made
payable on the 25th instant 9 or drawn Nov. 22, 1869, may be
made payable Dec. 3d, 1869 '0. A check may be drawn in Feb-
ruary but dated March. 5th or March 10th. Of such checks pay-
ment is not demandable until March 5th or March 10th, and pay-
ment may be stopped at any time before these dates". The ob-
ject of post-dating, or of making a check payable at a future
day, is to prevent presentation of the check to the bank for pay-
ment before the arrival of the day specified, so that the drawer
may meantime use his funds otherwise 2 . The drawer under-
takes to have the funds in the bank, on the day, but not before".
CASHIER'S CHECK.
The cashier of a bank may draw a check upon it for the
payment to X or order of a certain sum of money. This is known
as a cashier's check. It is not a check drawn on a different
bank from that of which he is cashier. A form is found in Mc-




"Pay to the order of John Drinker two hundred dollars.
"$200. William Morris, Cashier."
The cashier's check is a debt of the bank. The bank sub-
sequently making an assignment for creditors the holder of
this cheek if sued on a debt due by him to the bank may set off
677 Cyc. 531. A check is a bill of exchange. Hence, the act of Dec.
14th, 1854, making official acts, protests, etc., of all notaries public, receiv-
able in respect to the "dishonor of all bills and promisory notes" applies to
protests of a check. Lawson v. Richards, 6 Phila. 179.
6'Check delivered Jan. 5th but bearing date Jan. 10th; Hill v. Gaw, 4
Pa. 493.
OLawson v. Richards, 6 Phila. 179.
7 Champion v. Gordon 70 Pa. 474; Lancaster Bank v. Woodward, i8 Pa.
357; Fulwiler v. Hughes, 17 Pa. 440.
"Northumberland Bank v. McMichael, 106 Pa. 460.
2Walker v. Geisse, 4Wh. 252.
'3Champion v. Gordon, 70 Pa. 474.
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this check74 . The cashier's check performs the function of the
certification of a check. 75
MEMORANDUM CHECK.
A memorandum check, says Hunt, J., is an instrument
well known in commercial law. It is "in the ordinary form of a
bank check with the word "memorandum" or the abbreviation
"mem." written across its face. It is not intended for immedi-
ate presentation, but simply as evidence of an indebtedness by
the drawer to the holder. '
CHECK PAYABLE TO BEARER.
The act of May 16th, 1901, P. L. 194, declares that a check
is payable to bearer "when it is payable to the order of a fictitious
or non-existent person, and such fact is known to the person
making it so payable." The name of an actual person having
no relation to the transaction, no kncwledge of it may be used
in a check by the drawer, and the drawer may himself indorse
this check in the name of that person. The check will be con-
sidered payable to bearer. Such person will be a "fictitious"
person in the sense of the statute 7.
DAYS OF GRACE.
By the weight of authority, when a check was made ex-
pressly payable at a day future to that of its issue, it was treated
as a bill of exchange and days of grace were allowed. If the
check was in the ordinary form, or if it was post-dated, it was
not entitled to grace " . The 85th section of the act of May 16th
1901, relating to negotiable instruments, P. L. 194; 206, pro-
vides that "every negotiable instrument is payable at the time
fixed therein, without grace."
LIABILITY OF ENDORSER.
The endorser of a check is liable should it not be paid when
presented for payment in proper time, and should notice of non-
7 Farmers' Dep. Nat. Bank v. Penn Bank, 123 Pa. 283. It matters not
whether the defendant holds the check as owner or for the purpose of col-
lection for another, if the bank would have no defence, if sued by the owner
of the check.
75Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. 233.
76United States v. Isham, 84 U. S. 496. Cf. Appel v. Greenawald, 2
W. N. 395.
"Snyder v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599.
;7 Cyc. 868; Bromley v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 9 Phila. 522.
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payment be given to him in proper time. A check drawn by
A, payable to B on Oct. 9 was paid by a bank in Pottsville the
day it was drawn and was forwarded by that bank, through its
regular channel, to a bank in Philadelphia, and thence to Read-
ing, where was the bank on which it was drawn. It was protested
October l1th, because payment by the drawee bank had been
countermanded The distance between Pottsville and Reading,
says Orlady J., relieves the Pottsville bank of any charge of.neg-
I igence in the presentation of the check. B, the payee, had notice
of the non-payment from the bank, soon thereafter. The notary's
certificate indicated that proper presentment for payment and
notice of non-payment, had been given. The endorser was liable
to the endorsee. The fact that the endorser, before being
sued himself, brought suit before a justice, to the use of the
lPottsville bank, to recover from the drawer, the amount of
the check, and recovered a judgment, did not relieve him
from the payment to the bank. Nor was it necessary that
the bank should surrender the check before actual payment
of it. Although the Pottsville bank had given credit to B
as for cash on his depositing the check, it might be charged
back to him, should it turn out to be worthless, unless the bank
had been negligent or had done something to mislead the depos-
itor of the check, B, inducing him to act to his injury, on the
faith of the goodness of the check. Merely giving credit to B
on the check should not mislead him 9. Want of notice to the en-
dorser of a check of its non-payment will be no defence by him,
when sued by the endorsee if the check was given for the ac-
commodation of the endorser, and he was bound to provide
the funds to pay it.
ENDORSEMENT FOR ACCOMMODATION.
The endorser, when sued by the endorsee may prove that
he endorsed it for the accommodation of the plaintiff, upon the
express promise that he should incur no liability. The court
should admit proffered evidence not only of this agreement, but
"Union Safe Deposit Bank y. Strauch, 20 Super. 196. B suing the
drawer of the check before the justice, he could not when himself sued by
the Pottsville Bank, say that he had not received notice of the non-pay-
ment of the check in due time.
8 0Williams v. Hood, 1 Phila. 205. Whether under a count averring no-
tice, evidence of circumstances which excuse the notice may be given, is
said to be an unsettled question.
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of the circumstances attending it. These might satisfy the jury
that the agreement was made8'
RECEIVING CHECK AS PAYMENT.
When A, a creditor of B, receives from him a check in pay-
ment, it will be considered as payment only provisionally, that is
only if it is paid. If it is not paid, A may maintain an action
on the original cause or on the endorsement of the check, if
there be such 2. The check may be that of the debtor himself,
or that of another.3 Thus, if the acceptors of a draft pay the
holder by means of a cashier's check they remain liable upon the
acceptance, if the cashier's check is not duly paid.84 In payment
of rent, a check is tendered the lessor. The bank fails, on which
the check is drawn, and it is in consequence, not paid. The
lessor may resort to distress for the rent of which the check was
intended to secure the payment.' The vendor of goods who
has taken a check of a third person from a purchaser, may on
its non-payment, sue upon the contract of sale for the price.'
It is not necessary that suit be brought on the check against
its drawer (a third person) before suing on the original cause.
87
CHECK ABSOLUTE PAYMENT.
A check may be received by the creditor and delivered to
him by the debtor, as unconditional payment. That it is so re-
ceived is not presumed, but the contrary. That it is so received
must therefore be shown by the evidence. The burden of prov-
ing it is on the debtors unless indeed the plaintiff has proved it.
Although it is said that the agreement to receive the check as
8 Breneman v. Furniss, 11 Lanc. Bar. 17; 26 Pittsb. L. J. 196.
82McIntyre v. Kennedy, 29 Pa. 448. When A's right to recover from B
depends on B's having got the money on A's check it is not enough for A to
aver that he gave the check; Plunkett v. Hamnett, 36 Super. 590.
83McIntyre v. Kennedy 29 Pa. 448; Holmes v. Briggs 131 Pa. 233; Kil-
patrick v. B. & L. Ass., 21 W. N. 117; 119 Pa. 30; B. & L. Ass. v. Kilpat-
rick, 140 Pa. 405, Martin v. Pennock, 2 Pa. 376: Hackett v. Exchange, 36
Pitts. L. J. 40; Philadelphia v. Neill, 211 Pa. 353; Phila. v. Stewart, 195 Pa.
309 See 29 Pa. 448, for a discussion of the similarity of the case of a check
of a third person with the check of the debtor.
8 Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. 233; Cannonsburg Iron Co. v. Nat. Bank,
18 Pitts. L. J. 93; 4 Lanc. 30.
85Loux v. Fox 171 Pa. 68.
86Brggs v. Forrester, 2 W. N. 483.
87Martin v. Pennock, 2 Pa. 376.
BsPhiladelphia v. Neill, 211 Pa. 353.
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absolute payment must be "express," 8 it is also indicated
that the agreement may be "implied." That there was an agree-
ment that cashier's checks should be received as absolute pay-
ment may be shown by a previous course of dealing in which such
checks have been considered as cash, by a previous notice to the
debtor, in earlier transactions, that his own checks would not
be received and that he must furnish casfiier's checks.90 The
retention by the creditor of a cashier's check, after the insolvency
of the bank for several months, not giving notice of the non-pay-
ment of the check to the debtor, not offering to surrender the
check, applying for and receiving dividends from the bank's
estate upon the cashier's check, may be sufficient evidence for a
jury (not however for the court) to infer that the check was taken
as absolute payment' . In a case stated the statement must aver
that the check was received as absolute payment, or it will be
regarded as received conditionally. 92 Probably, if a creditor is
induced to accept a check as absolute payment, by fraudulent
means, he may treat it as no payment, and recover on the orig-
inal cause'.
CHECK MADE ABSOLUTE PAYMENT BY NEGLIGENCE.
It is elsewhere seen that the loss arising from the insolvency
of the bank upon which the check is drawn, or otherwise,'
may, if the consequence of improper delay in presenting the
check, fall upon the person to whom it was given in payment of
a debt, so that he could not have recourse to the debt, for the
purpose of suit" .
RECEIVING PAYMENT OF CHECK AS ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
If a check for less than the creditor's claim purporting to
be "in full of all accounts or claims of whatever kind or nature,"
accompanied by a letter from the debtor which requested the
creditor to return the check, if he should not be willing to ac-
8211 Pa. 353, Brown J., Philada. v. Stewart, 195 Pa. 309.
99Briggs v. Holmes, 118 Pa. 283. Cf. Canonsburg Iron Co. v. Nat.
Bank, 18 Pittsb. L. J. 93.
9'Holmes v. Briggs, 131 Pa. 233.
9zLoux v. Fox 171 Pa., 68, McIntyre v. Kennedy, 29 Pa. 448.
93Martin v. Pennock, 2 Pa. 376.
91The subsequent withdrawal of the money from the bank by the drawer;
Kilpatrick v. B. & L. Ass. 119 Pa. 30; B & L. Ass. v. Kilpatrick, 140 Pa. 405
95Briggs v. Forrester, 2 W. N. 483; Loux v. Fox, 171 Pa. 68; McIntyre
v. Kennedy 29 Pa. 448.
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cept it as payment in full, was deposited by the creditor in bank,
and he received the money on it, the creditor, it was held by Peck
J., could recover the balance of the debt,which was in judgmente'.
When a check containing the words' 'in full of all demands" is tak-
en by the payee, and the money obtained on it, he is not precluded
from recovering for wages, if the drawer of the check, the de-
fendant, testifies that he intended the check to pay the price of
some personal property bought by him from the payee, and that
he had no reference to the claim for wages, not knowing at the
time, that there existed such a claim, and the jury finds that
the check was not drawn with a view to the adjustment of the
claim for wages. If it was given and taken for the purpose of
effecting such adjustment, it would be a satisfaction of the de-
mand97 .
RECEIVING CHECK NOT AN ESTOPPEL.
One who gives a check in payment for material furnished
(grain to hogs) and work done, is not precluded after subse-
quently stopping payment, when sued upon the check, from
showing that the grain furnished later under the same contract
was of inferior quality, and from procuring a reduction. This he
may do under the plea of payment with leave, etc., and set off.
The check closed only those transactions covered by it, and
which were known to the drawer. Other and distinct breaches
by the plaintiff of the contract, could be shown in the suit on
the check, although they were known to the drawer when he
drew and delivered it9 . Givin, having paved the street in front
of the lot of Kelley and having a municipal claim against Kelly's
lot transferred the claim to the Richmond Granite Company.
Kelley in part payment of this claim, gave his check to the Com-
pany for $300 but later stopped payment of it because of the poor
quality of the work; the breach of the contract resulting in dam-
age to Kelly to an extent greater than the check. In a scirefa-
cias on the municipal claim, Kelly was permitted to show these
facts, without showing that the present plaintiff was connected
with or responsible for Givin, or that it had made any false
representation to induee Kelly to give the check .
96Tucker v. Murray, 2 Dist. 497.
9
1Krauser v. McCurdy, 174 Pa. 174.
98Uhler v. Sanderson, 38 Pa. 128.
99Ricbmond Granite Co. v. Kelly, 2 W. N. 396.
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ESTOPPEL AGAINST DENYING THAT CHECK IS PAYMENT.
A creditor entitled to cash, is not bound to receive a check.
A landlord whose lease entitles him to forfeit it, unless the rent
is paid regularly, may insist on payment in cash, at the speci-
fied times. If however he has received checks, or not receiving
them when offered, has assigned some other reason than that he
was entitled to cash, he cannot eject the tenant, if the only
default is the tender of checks instead of money'.
CHECKS AS EVIDENCE.
A check is an order upon a bank for the payment of money
to a certain person. The money if paid by the bank, will be
charged by it against the deposit of the drawer, or against him
personally. It is evident, that the check preexists the payment
of it. It may never be paid at all. Hence proof of the exist-
ence of the check is not proof of the payment of the money by
the drawer, or the bank, to the payee or holder. Additional ev-
idence is necessary to establish the payment. Possession of the
check by the drawer, after the lapse of 50 years and the en-
dorsement on the check of the name of the payee with other
facts, would warrant an inference that the check was paid'. In
Patton's Administrators v. Craig's Administrators3 it was im-
portant to prove that C made a check payable to P and that
P got the money upon it. C's signature to the check was proved;
also the fact that the check bore the mark of having been can-
celed in the bank upon which it had been drawn; that it was
found after C's death, among his papers. The bank book of
C was also put in evidence, containing entries alleged to be made
by the bank officer. It was held that proof should have been
given by the bank clerk or,he being dead,by some one acquainted
with his handwriting, to the fact that the entries in it were
made by him. Bank books should not be received in evidence,
"without the entries being verified by the oath of the clerk who
made them unless such proof is dispensed with by the opposite
party. With the entries in the bank book properly proved, the
'Pershing v. Feinberg, 203 Pa. 144.2Union Canal Co. v. Loyd, 4 W. & S. 393. Ordinarily the genuineness
of the endorsement of the payee, would need to be proved, but not, prob-
ably, after a lapse of 5oyears,
37 S. & R. ix6. The teller's testimony that the check is credited on
the books, was receivable as evidence of payment; Henry v. Oves, 4 W. 46.
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check appearing to have been paid by the bank might be inferr-
ed to have been paid to P.
CHECK PAYABLE TO A OR BEARER.
Payment of a check payable to A or bearer, is not evidence
that it was paid to A. Any one holding it might receive pay-
ment. There must therefore be something further than that
the check was paid to some holder, to justify the inference that
it was paid to A4.
WHAT INFERENCE FROM PAYMENT?
But suppose the receipt of the money upon the check to
have been established. A may pay money to B, as a gift; as a
loan; as a satisfaction of an existing debt. Is the payment of
a check evidence of a gift? "It never was held in any court"
says Coulter, J., "that a check was any evidence of a gift."'
Nor may the inference be made from the mere fact of A's paying
money, whether by means of a check through a bank or other-
wise, to B that A is lending the money to B, and thus creating
a liability in B to repays. Of course, there may be evidence
additional to that of the mere passing of money from A to B,
which would justify the belief that it passed as a loan, or gift.
In the absence of additional evidence, the legitimate inference
from the payment of money is that it puts an end to an existing
obligation-not that it gives origin to an obligation. Hence
the payment will be presumed to be that of a debt.8 In a suit
for a debt of $300 by A against B, B may prove the delivery of a
check to A, since the origin of the debt, for $150, upon which
the money was obtained. This will be presumed a payment
fro tan/o.9 It has appeared sufficiently, that the presumption
that money obtained on a check puts an end to an existing obli-
gation of the drawer, is not conclusive. He may furnish evi-
dence that he was under no prior obligation, that the money
4Henry v. Oves, 4 W. 46; Patton's Admr. v. Creig's Admr. 7 S. & R. z i6.
5Baker vs. Williamson 4 Pa. 456, 469; Fleming v. McClain, 13 Pa. 177.
6Lowrey v. Robinson 141 Pa. 189: Bougher v. Cona 17 Phila, 8i.; Pat-
ton v. Ash 7 S.& R. T25; Fleming v. McClain 13 Pa. 177; McClainv. Peart
145 Pa, 576; Gettysburg Nat. Bank v. Kuhns, 62 Pa. 88; Groom's Estate 5
Lanc. 309; Moyle's Estate, 7 KuIp, 215; Miller v. Garrecht, 17 Lanc. 133.
7Fleming v. McClain, 13 Pa. 177.
8Baker v. Williamson, 4 Pa. 456; 469 Huntzinger v. Jones, 6o Pa. 17o;
Bougher v. Conn. 17 Phila. 81; Fleming v. McClain, 13 Pa. 177.
9Mosser v. Bowen, 29 Pa. 128; Henry v. Oves, 4 W. 46.
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was a loan, etc. The jury must decide, upon such evidence,
what the object of the payment was.'o
CHECK FOR CASH RECEIVED AT THE TIME.
Often the presumption from the payment of a check is de-
scribed as the presumption that it was given in payment of a
debt, or for cash received for it at the time"' but the receipt
of cash at the time, creates a debt, and the subsequent
payment of the check, is a payment of that debt. It is un-
necessary to distinguish between a debt that began to exist be-
fore the check was given, and one that arose simultaneously
with the check. A check drawn by the paymaster of the
U. S. A. upon the Assistant Treasurer of the U. S. at
New York payable to the cashier of the Gettysburg Nation-
al Bank, was held presumably to have been delivered to the
bank for a consideration moving from it at the time, and not to
create a debt of the bank to anybody; not to the drawer of the
check, and not to any other, for whose benefit it was suggested
that it had been drawn".
EVIDENCE OF COLLATERAL FACTS.
That A has acted as president of a corporation, maybe shown
by evidence that he has done acts which only a president could
regularly do. If the issue of corporation checks is the function of
its president the issue by A of its checks may be received as evi-
dence that he was acting as such. It is also evidence that the
corporation did the work, which it had contracted to do, the
checks being for material or work called for by the contract' 3.
"0Musser v. Bowen 29 Pa. i28. In Philips v. Menges, 4 Wh. 225, re-
plevin by a tenant of goods distrained by a landlord, the question was
whether the rent for a quarter ending Feb. t5th, 1833, had been paid. A
check drawn on that day for the same amount, payable to the landlord, was
shown to have been paid. But it might have been for an earlier quarter.
The fact that the check was dated on the day on which the quarter ended,
and the quarter's rent became due, was not sufficient to warrant the infer-
ence that it was for that quarter's rent. Had other evidence shown that
the payment was of that quarter's rent there would have been a presumption
that the rent for earlier quarters had been paid.
"Gettysburg Nat. Bank v. Kuhns, 62 Pa.88. Lowry v. Robinson, 141
Pa. 189; Ritchie v. Deposit & Trust Co., x89 Pa. 41o; Fleming v. McClain,
1.3 Pa. 177; Smith's Estate, 2z Lanc. 137; Miller v. Garrecht, 17 Lanc. 133.
"Gettysburg Nat. Bank v. Kuhns, 62 Pa. 88. It was not incumbent on
the bank to prove that it gave value for the check. That it did so is pre-
sumed.
"3Union Canal Co. v. Loyd, 4 W. & S. 393.
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LENDING A CHECK.
A may make a check payable to the order of B, with the
understanding that B, procuring it to be certified, shall retain
it a certain time, and then return it. If in violation of this
agreement, B collects the check from the drawee bank, A may
recover the money from him'4 .
ALTERED CHECKS.
The 124th section of the act of March 16, 1901,entitled "An
act relating to negotiable instruments" prescribes that "where
a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the assent
of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided except as against a
party who has himself made, authorized or assented to the al-
teration and subsequent indorsers, but when an instrument has
been materially altered and is in the hands of a holder in due
course not a party to the alteration he may enforce payment
thereof according to its original tenor." When a claim is made
against the drawer of a check, or against his executor, if the
check appears on its face to have been changed in a material
part, the person offering it, must explain the alteration. But
it is not necessary that it should appear that the check had at one
time borne words of a different import from that which the words
now on it bear. it is enough that the paper has been scratched
and that the words upon the scratched part are written by a
different pen with different ink by a different hand from the
other and that these words are compressed, crowded and cramp-
ed. Such an appearance of the check should be explained.
A check for the "sum of fourteen hundred TY dollars" was of-
fered in evidence. The signing and a portion of the surface
of the paper had been removed when the words "teen hundred"
were written. The paper there was so thin that holding it to
the light one could almost see through it. The marks of an
instrument with a sharp edge, were plain. It was plain that
the words "the sum of four * * 2w-u-u were unaltered. The let-
ters "teen hundred" were cramped. The scraped space was just
sufficient to have held the word "hundred"in the size of the
rest of the letters. The figure 1 in the corner was very close to the
'"Rafferty v. Masonic Bank 4 Sadler, 71. But if A gave thecheck pay-
able to the B bank in order to pay a debt of X, owed in part to the state, in
part to the B. bank and the understanding was merely that the bank should
hold the check for a few days only, and then that it might collect it Acould
not recover from it the money collected in conformity with this agreement.
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dollar mark, was of a darker shade or color than the other fig-
ures. The supreme court thought the alteration manifest at
the first glance. It might have been made at the time of the
delivery of the check, but as the whole of the check was in the
hand of the payee, it was his duty to explain the scraping and
the alteration. The death of the payee did not excuse his ad-
ministrator from explaining. Hence, without such explanation
the check probably should not be received in evidence. But if re-
ceived it would not support a finding for the payee, unless there
was explanation: The burden is on the proponent of the check"5 ,
A check dated July 28, 1885, payable to Louis Prentice for $7.75,
was drawn by Woodward & Harris upon their bank. This
check was altered into one payable to H. L. Martin, for $900,
and the date was changed to Aug. 3d, 1885. After this altera-
tion the cashier of the bank had certified it. Thus certified it
was passed to X. X deposited it with his bank obtaining a
credit for it. That bank forwarded it by mail to the M. Bank
in New York; The M. Bank sent it for collection through the
clearing house, and it was paid by the bank on which it was
drawn. The P. bank discovered later, that the check had
been altered and raised; the P. bank demanded and obtained
repayment from the M. bank; that bank obtained repayment
from bank L. Bank L. had a right to charge it back to its de-
positor X from whom it received it.'6 The altered check was a
a nullity apparently, even as against the bank which had certified
it, and every bank buying this check, had a right to recover the
money paid for it by it, from the bank or person from whom it
got it.
16Nagle's Estate 134 Pa. 31.
16Rupp v. Nat. Bank, 136 Pa. 426.
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MOOT COURT.
TOURMALINE vs. HOLMES.
Libel-Unwitting use of Plaintiffs Name-Legal Malice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Holmes publishes a newspaper. In one of its issues it contained an
imaginative account of a man, who, having wrecked a train and then
stolen $]100,000, from it fled to Australia. This man was named Henry
Tourmaline. No person of that name other than the plaintiff was known
to be in the community. Some readers of the paper perceived that the
sketch was imaginative and not intended to apply to the plaintiff. It was
proved at the trial (libel) that four persons who read the article thought
it was intended to refer to the plaintiff, and two of them believed it.
Holmes did not know plaintiff; did not know he even existed. He had
seen the name Henri Tourmaline in a French novel and thus fell on the
use of its English equivalent. He asked the court to say that if this was
so there could be no recovery.
DICKSON for plaintiff.
WARRINGTON for defendant.
OPINION OF THF COURT.
MARSHALL, J.-As shown by the facts Holmes wrote this imaginary
story using the name of Henry Tourmaline not knowing there was a person
in the community by that name. The substance of the story was the in-
famous and indictable offense of wrecking a train and stealing $ 100,000
from it.
Leading decisions in Pennsylvania state libel to be, "Any malicious
publication written, printed or painted, which by words or signs tends to
expose a person to contempt, ridicule, hatred or degradation of character,
and the person libelled may recover damages, unless it be shown that the
publication was true, or justifiably made. " Neeb v. Hope, 111 Pa. 145;
Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385. It is noted in Collins v. Dispatch Pub. Co.,
152 Pa. 187 that the word "malicious " is eliminated from the definition.
In this case the defendant Holmes does not require the use of an in-
nuendo as the article published imputes an offense libelous per se. It is
stated in 152 Pa. 187 "that the office of the innuendo is to aver the mean-
ing of the language published; but if the common understanding of man-
kind takes hold of the words at once without dfficulty and applies a libel-
ous meaning to thein, an innuendo is not needed." In 179 Pa. 98; 8 Sup.
Ct. 152; 192 Pa. 585 the same doctrine is held pertaining to words libel-
ous per se. The plaintiff in this case labors to prove malice, when, in
fact, the words imply malice, from the fact that they are libelous and
actionable per se. Suffice it to state that "Malice in its legal sense
means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse and
every utterance or publication having the other qualities of slander and
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libel, if it be wilful and unauthorized is in law malicious and sufficient to
support an action, " 87 Pa. 385; 111 Pa. 145.
It is heldin 6 W. N. C. 273, "Where an artidle is libelous per se and
is not privileged in its character, the publishers failing to establish its
truthfulness are liable for damages." We are of the opinion this article
is far from privileged according to 8 Superior Ct. 152-"A communica-
tion to be privileged must be made upon a proper occasion, from proper
motive, in proper manner and be based upon reasonable and probable
cause." Again, we are of the opinion that the affair is a display of neg-
ligence. The defendant should have issued a statement in his paper the
day or so following showing that the story was imaginative or fictitious,
or he might have made some effort to ascertain whether or not there was
such a person in the community. No evidence was introduced to show
that he had made any effort along either line suggested, or any other.
Furthermore, in accordance with the act of Assembly of 1901 which
reads "In all civil actions for libel, the plea of justification shall be ac-
cepted as an adequate and complete defense when it is pleaded and prov-
en to the satisfaction of the jury under the direction of the court as in
other cases, that the publication is substantially true and proper for pub-
lic information or investigation and has not been maliciously or negligent-
ly made," this court is of the opinion that the verdict must be given for
the plaintiff, because the article was as heretofore shown, both ma-
liciously and negligently made.
In 159 Mass. 293, Hansom v. Globe Pub. Co., the court held that "a
mistake in the name of a person mentioned in a report would not sustain
an action for libel;" but in that case the libel was not actionable per se.
We venture to say that if the case at bar were tried in the same court in
Massachusetts they would decide that, if the words were actionable per
se, the plaintiff should succeed.
A man's right to a good name should be jealously guarded with all
possible care, and we think if the law should grow lax in this principle
it would prove disastrous to society.
Holmes should respond in damages in the same way a man should who
firing a gun into the street and injuring a man, should set up the defense
that no one was known to be there.
In view of the evidence presented this court is of the opinion that the
verdict should be for the Plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The 3rd section of the act of April l1th 1901, 2 Stewart's Pardon,
2251, enacts that "In all civil actions [for libel] no damages shall be re-
covered unless it is established to the satisfaction of the jury that the
publication has been maliciously or negligently made, but where malice
or negligence -appears, such damages may be awarded, as the jury shall
deem proper." The act contemplates the possibility of actionable defa-
mation without malice, for if the jury finds it to have' been either
maliciously or negligently made, it is authorized to award damages.
This indicates that "malice" was not used in the sense of "legal
malice" since all actionable defamation must have been done with
"legal malice ;" legal malice being simply that state of things which
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excludes a justification; the absence of privilege, the presence of the
defaming elements in the publication. The act has been rendered useless
however, by the judicialdiscovery that "malice" in it means "legal mal-
ice" Says Mitchell J. "The act has not made any change in the law
in this respect." Clark v. North American Co. 203 Pa. 346.
Was the act of Holmes "legally" malicious? He did not intend to
portray any actual person. He imagined a man, a train wrecker, a rob-
ber. He pictured him as having fled to Australia. He named this imag-
inary man Henry Tourmalihe. He had never known or heard of an actual
man of that name, but he had read a French novel one of whose heroes
was called therein, "Henri Tourmaline." He transferred this name,
Englished, to his own historiette. It does not appear that his use of the
name was negligent. It is rare. The probability that any one within the
range of his publication, bore that name was feeble. Shall we then say
that, since there was in fact a Henry Tourmaline in the community, and
since the story was so framed that four persons were stupid enough to
suppose that it aimed at him, and two of these four believed in conse-
quence of it that he had done the things thus imputed to him, the defend-
ant is guilty of a libel?
That ufider such circumstances, the writer of such a story is guilty of
a libel has been decided recently in England (1909) by a very able court.
Jones v. Hutton & Co. L. R. 2K. B. 444. The reasoning of Justice Holmes,
in his dissent from the judgment in Hansom v. Globe Newspaper Co. 159
Mass. 293, would sustain the English decision.
On the other hand, that decision is disapprovingly criticised by so
good an authority as Sir Ferderick Pollock in the Law Quarterly Review,
and it is, we think, inconsistent with the logic of the court in 159 Mass.
293, supra. It. was there held that a statement concerning one de-
scribed as H. P. Hansom, a real estate and insurance broker of South
Boston, which was untrue, as to him, but which wastrue as to A. P. H.
Hansom, who was also a real estate and insurance broker of South Bos-
ton, the writer laving used the former name by mistake, was not an ac-
tionable libel of H. P. Hansom. In Smith v. Ashley ,11 Metc. 367, the
publisher of a newspaper was held not guilty of libel, if he believed the
article published to be a fancy sketch, though the author of it intended
it to apply to the plaintiff. The writer, who had this intention, was
alone responsible. [This decision is criticised by Odger, on Libel and Slan-
der.]
Reputation is no more valuable than health, and wholeness of body.
If A injures B, corporeally, e. g. in shooting or driving, or operating an
engine, but without malice or negligence, he not liable. His act is not a
tort. Some scope must be allowed by the law to the activities of men. They
are not to be weighted down with liability for the consequences of their
actions to other men simply because they are consequences. The law,
gives immunity in many cases when the act has not been characterized by
negligence or malice. "The free communication of thoughts and opinions,
is one of the invaluable rights of men," [says the Constitution of Pennsyl-
vania] as is that of free activity of other forms, and it is as absurd to make
a man responsible for the injury to the reputation of others, which his
words without intention and without negligence may inflict, as to make
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him responsible for corporal injuries occasioned without malice or negli-
gence. If a man must publish stories about human beings, at his peril,
in case they happen to be applied by a reader to-some particular person,
to his disparagement, why must he not run, or shoot, or drive, or gener-
ate steam in a boiler, or explode dynamite, at his peril, if, even without
negligence and malice, somebody is hurt?
We are unwilling to recognize a principle that under the facts devel-
oped in the court below, would make the defendant liable. If the plaintiff's
reputation has been impaired, he must console himself, as his fellow men
do, with the reflection that living in society, some detriment must oc-
casionlly be suffered and with resignation, from the activities of those
about him, whether physical or intellectual. Not for every damage that
one gets from the acts of his neighbors, is the state going to give him
compensation.
Judgment reversed.
JOHN BECK vs. WM. HARRIMAN
Negligent Frightening of a Horse-Depreciation of Value
Measure of Damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Harriman left a pile of logs 8 ft., high in the highway and covered
them with a piece of white canvas. Beck, driving in the dusk of the eve-
ning, his horse became alarmed and ran away. It was ever after ex-
tremely timid and could no longer be used as a carriage horse. Before,
its value was $200 and after it was but $75. Defendant asked the court
to say that there could be no recovery for the "psychological deterioration
of the horse, due to fright."
GILBERT, for Plaintiff.
BADGER, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
COLLINS J.--The question involved here is whether the rule, largely
followed, that individuals cannot recover damages for nervous shock and
mental suffering, should be applied to horses. Inquiry into the reasons for
a rule is necessary when one contemplates some new or larger applica-
tion of it. Wherefore we ask :-Are nervous shock and mental suffering
in themselves, and the alleged difficulty in determining the damages for the
same, the true grounds for the refusal by the courts to award damages
for injury by fright?
"Mental suffering presents no features by which a court or jury can
determine either its existence or extent, and claims founded on it have
generally been regarded as too uncertain and too speculative for consid-
eration," Linn v. Dusquesne, 204 Pa. 551. The courts give ready assent
to a fair compensation for an injury to some physical member, and does
any reasonable man or physician question the costliness of ill health oc-
casioned by nervous shock? The loss of a finger has its price. But the
loser does not become a burden to others, his earning power is not ap-
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preciably diminished, nor is his enjoyment of life greatly crippled. Now,
a nervous shock which makes one an object of sorrow and care to one's
friends, shrivels one's companionableness, halts one's usefulness, is to be
ignored because its "existence and extent" cannot be determined!
Let us look, then, at some of the things that the courts regard as hav-
ing determinable " existence and extent. " They lend themselves to fix-
ing, with firmness and accuracy, damages for "injury to feelings and
affections. " (Markley v. Kessering, 2 Penny. 187, in breach of promise
suits.) Heart suffering, then, is more tangible than mental suffering? We
think not, and if the courts recognize one, why not the other? They do get
at the other. They recognize the element of mental suffering in actions
of malicious prosecution, in defamation cases, and in cases where the
nervous shock and mental suffering accompanies or is due to some physi-
cal injury.
Nervous shock and mental suffering are not illusions. In as much as
the courts recognize them when they accompany well establised grounds
of actions, the question arises, what is the true source of the reluctance
of the courts to award damages for physical and and mental weaknesses
brought on by frightl We believe it is clearly indicated in the following: -
"It requires but a brief judicial experience to be convinced of the exag-
eration and even of actual fraud in the ordinary action for physical injur-
ies from negligence, and if we opened the door to this new invention
(mental disturbance) the result would be great damage, if not disaster to
the cause of practical justice." Huston v. Freemansburg Borough 212 Pa.
548.
"If mere fright unaccompanied by bodily injury, is a cause of action
the scope of what are now known as accident cases will be greatly en-
larged; for in every case of a collision on a railroad the passengers,
though sustaining no injury would have cause for action on ground of
fright." Ewing v. Reading Railway Co., 147 Pa. 40.
"In Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad, 168 Mass. 285, the exemption
from liability is based not on grounds that fright and anxiety do not con-
stitute actual injury or that mental and physical effects may not be directly
traceable as a consequence of unintentional negligence,but on the ground
that in practice it is impossible to administer any other rule without
opening a wide door to unjust claims which cannot be satisfactorily
met, " Linn v. Dusquesne Borough, 204 Pa. 551.
There is so much fraud practised in accident and negligence cases
that the courts clearly fear what it might come up to, if fright and men-
tal suffering should be made sufficient grounds for maintaining damage
suits. Inasmuch as law reflects the development of people it is logical to
conclude that when the moral tone of the people rises above what the
courts now regard it to be, the way will be opened for actions based on
fright and nervous shock?
Now, is the horse tainted with fraud? We are of the opinion that it
has not yet acquired the mental equipment whereby it can arrange with
its owner to frighten badly on the first occasion that it finds the highway
to have been used negligently; to maintain such timid, fractious manners,
so as greatly to depreciate its value; to return to its former usefulness
and reasonable gentleness, when its owner has received the difference
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between its market value before and its market value during the period
of assumed debility. The field for fraud is not widened we believe in al-
lowing damages for a horse whose roadworthiness has been decreased by
fright, through the negligence of another.
Mereover, the contention in mental suffering cases on the part of indi-
viduals, that damages are not easily ascertainable, is not applicable to a
horse. A horse is something which is bought and sold and the damages,
which, in a case like the present one, are the the difference between the
maket value before and after the accident, can readily be found.
This request of the defendant we are obliged to refuse.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The sole question before us is, whether there can be a recovery for
the psychological deterioration of the horse due to fright, occasioned by
the unjustifiable exposure, on or near the highway, of an object fitted to
produce fright in ordinarily courageous horses.
That objects may frigthen horses is a fact to which courts will not close
their eyes. Mallory v. Guffey, 85 Pa. 275; Potter v. Gas Company, 183 Pa.
575; Piolett v. Simmers 106 Pa. 95; North Manheim Township v. Arnold
119 Pa. 380; Burrell Township v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. 353; 29 Cyc. 469, 33
Cyc. 1166. Equally recognized is the possibility that the horse's fright
may be a cause. It may cause in him convulsive and irrational actions.
These actions may in various ways, cause damage to person or property;
The horse himself, may be injured or killed, as e. g. by rushing into an
iron bridge, 119 Pa. 380 supra. The vehicle which he is drawing may
be damaged Id, Pittsburg etc R. R. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. 306. The person
in the vehicle may be injured, 183 Pa. 575; 106 Pa. 95; 85 Pa. 275; 104 Pa.
306. The injury whether 'to person or property, may be connected with
the act of the person who exposes the alarming object, through the nexus
of the fear. The contention would not be tolerated, that fear cannot be
a cause of sudden, violent and uncalculated muscular movement, whether
of man or animals, and that the human cause of the fear cannot be made
responsible for the consequences of his act or omission, although mediated
by fear.-29 Cyc. 503.
That terror may be a cause of brain and nerve changes, which mani-
fest themselves in a permanently altered emotional and mental state, it
would be absurd for any court to deny. The evidence in the court below
was clear that ever after the fright, the plaintiff's horse was "extremely
timid;" could not be used as a carriage horse, although, down to the
occurrence, he had been valuable as such, and possessed of a reliable tem-
per. The jury has been convinced that the fright caused this deterioration.
Why, then, should the defendant not compensate the plaintiff for the
depreciation of the horse?
Not, surely, because that deterioration was not the foreseeable con-
sequence. Permanent changes in the qualities of a horse from terror are
not so rare that persons may not be properly required to anticipate them
as likely results of fright.
Not, surely, because'the expectation of the probable effect of these
changes on the usableness of the horse, and, consequently, upon its market
value, could not be legitimately required.
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Objection has been made to allowing damages for the corporeal results
of fear in human beings, largely for reasons that impeach the competency
or the integrity of the tribunals which the state has appointed to try
causes involving such questions. Because in six or seven cases out of
ten, the jury will find, as results of fear, phenomena which do not exist
at all, or are not results of fear, -the astute policy has been adopted by
sorfie courts, of refusing damages in the other three cases, how clear and
incontestable soever, the injury and the sequence of the injury upon the
fear, may be. It would be much better we opine, to adopt measures .to
get a more reliable trier of facts, than, clinging to the present trier,
sullenly and insolently to tell litigants who have really suffered that
they shall have no redress, because, if redress for them is made pbssible,
similar redress for the unworthy will, with the present rickety and
untrustworthy machine for administering justice, accompany it.
The learned court below has indicated reasons for not extending to
the results of hippic fear the doctrine thought reasonable with respect to
those of anthropic fear. A man may feign fear; and allege results
within his own body and mind, the existence of which will have to be
accepted on his own testimony. Hence, opportunities, for imposture;
hence, denial of all remedy, even to the honest, for the gravest results of
the wrongful acts of others. But, whether a horse was roadworthy or
not, others than its owner may know. Whether it was scared or not,
may be known from the characteristic conduct of a frightened horse;-
its rearing, plunging, running. Whether its qualities were different
after such catastrophe, dozens of witnesses may be aware. The
horse is not the witness, nor, as to its qualities before and after the
fright, is its owner the sole witness; nor, often, even as to the fright
itself. It would be absolutely indefensible to decline compensation for
all consequences of negligence, mediated through the fear of the horse,
in submission to a foolish maxim that psychic causes and effects cannot
become a ground of liability.
The opinion of the learned court of common pleas sufficiently vindi-
cates the judgment.
Affirmed.
IN RE RHOADS' ASSIGNMNT
Federal Bankrupt Act-Pennsytvania Insolvent Law of 1901.
Debtor's Exemption.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
A assigns for 1he benefit of his creditors, reserving and claiming
his exemption of $300. The assignee accepts the trust.
At the appraisement of the estate, $300 of the fund, to be produced
by the sale of the real estate, -there being no personal property, -is set
aside for and awarded to A, by the duly appointed appraisers as his exemp-
tion.
The appraisement of the $300 to A, as his exemption, is regularly
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filed in accordance with the practice in the Court of Common Pleas.
There.is no rule of the Court requiring the confirmation of the appraise-
ment and allowance of the $ 300, exemption, by the court.
After such setting aside, awarding, and filing of the appraisement,
but before the sale of the real estate, i. e., while the estate is still in the
hands of the assignee, B, a judgment creditor, which judgment contains
a waiver of the $300 exempted, issues an attachment against the assignee.
KINNARD, for plaintiff.
MILLER, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MAUCH, J. -The plaintiff contends:
I. That, "This is a voluntary proceeding by a person, other than a
corporation, and is therefore within the jurisdiction of the Federal Bank-
rupt Act of 1898."
II. That, "the Bankruptcy act suspends the State act of 1901, as to
all persons to which the former refers."
III. That " the Federal act of 1898 cannot be disregarded and pro-
ceedings had under the state laws at the election of the debtor."
I. The court admits that a voluntary proceeding by a person, other
than a corporation, is within the jurisdiction of the Federal act. But this is
not such a voluntary proceeding as will invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal
act. Before an insolvent debtor or the creditor of such insolvent debtor can
reap the benefits conferred by the National act, he must signify his inten-
tion by proceeding in the manner and form prescribed by the act.
II. " The Bankruptcy act of 1898 suspends the State act of 1901, as to
all persons as to which the former act refers," when invoked by such "per-
sons" or by their "qualified creditors." All the debtor has done, in the case
at bar, is, to make an assignment for the benefit of creditors; all that the
creditor, B, has done, is, to issue an attachment against the assignee.
Neither of these acts can take the place nor have the effect, of
the filing of petitions which is necessay to invoke the Federal act,
neither has this court the authority to grant relief under the laws over
which the Federal courts within this Commonwealth have sole and origi-
nal jurisdiction.
In support of his second contention, the plaintiff can cite only one
Pennsylvania case of note which has a direct bearing on the case at bar.
In this case, Judge Henderson said: " The law would be vain which
would invite legal process liable to be avoided and defeated at any stage
of the proceedings by the assertion of another and paramount authority;
it should be effective for the purpose of carrying to conclusion proceed-
ings instituted thereunder." The act of 1901. fully covers the subject of
assignments. The act is very "effective for the purpose of carrying to
conclusion" such "proceedings instituted thereunder." Neither is such
"legal process liable to be avoided and defeated at any stage of the pro-
ceedings by the assertion of another and paramount authority." Such
other and paramount authority must be asserted within four months
after the time the assignment was made, in the manner and form pre-
scribed by that authority, or the assertion of said authority will be of no
avail.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW 173
The Supreme Court of Conn. in 2 Bank. Reg. 122, held a voluntary
assignment by a debtor under the insolvent law of the state valid, although
the United States Bankrupt act was in existence and applicable to the
case at the time of the assignment. "An assignment by an insolvent
debtor of his property to trustees for the equal and common benefit of all
his creditors is not fraudulent, and, when executed six months (now
four months by the act of 1898.) before proceedings in bankruptcy are
taken against the debtor, is not assailabl; by the assignee in bankruptcy
subsequently appointed." 91 U. S. 496.
"A general assignment of a debtor's property made for the benefit of
creditors, purporting to be made under a state insolvent law which had,
at the time of the assignment, been suspended in whole or in part by a
bankrupt act, may, nevertheless, be sustained as sufficient to pass title to
ssignees, in the absence of proceedings in bankruptcy impeaching it, or of
appropriate steps by the assignor for its cancellation." 108 U. S. 379.
It would seem from the above cases, that at least a few of the highest
courts in the land think that such a state insolvent law is not vain.
Again, says Henderson, J.: " It is conceded on all sides, however, that
any proceedings under the insolvent law of the state might be rendered
abortive by an insolvent debtor or his qualified creditors by filing a peti-
tion in bankruptcy where the debtor was subject to the operation of the
National bankrupt act." This is partly true. But suppose the insolvent
debtor or his qualified creditors do not file a petition, what then renders
the act abortive? The above proposition practically admits that without
such action by the debtor or his qualfied creditors the act is not rendered
abortive.
Again: "There might and doubtless would be conflict in the operation
of the national and state statutes. The latter must, therefore, yield to the
former. The uniformity contemplated by the Constitution can only be se-
cured through the act of Congress; the prosecution of insolvent proceedings
under the laws of the various states necessarily tending to confusion and
lack of uniformity. " As to this proposition Justice Johnson, as early as
25 U. S. 213, declared: " I pronounce the exclusive power of Congress
over insolvents untenable, and the dangers apprehended from the con-
trary doctrine unreal. At all events,whatever be the degree of evil to be
produced by such laws, the limits of its action are necessarily confined to
the territory of those who inflict it." Fuller C. J. in 133 U. S. 107 says
that state insolvent laws are binding upon such persons as were citizens
of the state at the time the debt was contracted." Judge Stewart in
25 C. C. 353 says: "If in Pennsylvania we choose to administer insolv-
ent estates in our own vk ay and in our own courts when Federal authority
has not actually attached the person or property of the bankrupt, we are
strictly within our rights; and within these limits our state laws may
operate without infringing in the slightest degree upon Federal suprem-
acy." It is ridiculous to speak of a conflict of laws in this case. There
can be no conflict unless two or more laws are operative in the same juris-
diction and at the same time. The state law is operative only in the
absence of operation by the Federal law. The Federal law becomes
operative only when properly invoked.
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The uniformity contemplated by the Constitution, is not uniformity
within the states but uniformity between the states. This may seem like
a distinction without a difference, but there is a distinct difference. The
Constitution contemplated, and Congress enacted, a law whose discharges
in bankruptcy would be effective as a defense to any proceedings in
bankruptcy thereafter begun in any state or Federal court against the
same bankrupt.
The plaintiff further contends that the Federal act of 1898 cannot be
disregarded and proceedings had under the state laws by the election of
the debtor. The act of 1898 can be disregarded by election of the debtor
if his creditors acquiesce in his election or refuse to take action under the
Federal act within the four-months' limit.
In the case at bar there was a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors. A general assignment for the benefit of creditors is an act of
bankruptcy. But where such assignment has been made and proceed-
ings are not instituted in bankruptcy within the statutory four months
thereafter, the state court may proceed to administer the estate under
local statutes, and a trustee appointed in bankruptcy subsequent to the
four months cannot attack such proceedings. While under Federal lawa
voluntary deed of assignment is an act of bankruptcy, yet it is not for
this reason void, but creates a trust so far valid that unless superseded
by adverse proceedings in the Federal courts within four months next
following its execution, it will result in an entirely legal conversion and
distribution of the estate assigned to and among the beneficiaries. This
is supported by reason and authority.
In so far as the case at bar is concerned, Sec. 31 of the act of June
4, 1901, is the law governing the case. That section declares "an insol-
vent shall be entitled to the same exemption out of the assigned estate
as he would be had an execution been issued against him; and his right
thereto shall not be denied for or by reason of the character of any claim
presented; or by reason of any waiver in any contract or judgment; or
by reason of failure to reserve it in the deed of assignment." And since
the act makes it mandatory upon the courts to stay writs of attachment
against the assigned property, the judgment must be for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
In a great majority of the states in which the question has arisen it
has been decided that the enactment of a bankruptcy law by Congress
ipso facto suspends all state insolvency laws in so far as they relate to the
same subject matter and affect the same persons as the bankruptcy law.
Parmenter Mgf. Co. v. Hamilton 172 Mass. 178; Ketcham v. McNamara 72
Conn. 709; Armour Co. v. Brown 76 (Minn.) 465; Harbaugh v. Costello 184
Ill. 110; Palmer v. Hexon 74 Me. 447; Martin v. Berry 37 Cal. 208; Van
Noshan v. Carr 30 Md. 128; Simpson v. Bank 56 N. H. 466; Boise v.
Locke 17 Hun. (N. Y.) 466; Orr v. Lisso 33 La. Ann. 476; Segnitz v.
Banking Co., 107 Wis. 171. See also 43 L. R. A. 186 and Cyc. Supplement
(1909) 483, for numerous other cases.
The question is one arising under the constitution and laws of the
United States and the decisions of the Federal courts are therefore, per-
tinent and controlling. By these courts it has been decided that the en-
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actment of the act of 1898 ipso facto suspended the operation of the in-
solvency laws of Wisconsin, New York, Maryland, Indiana, Kentucky,
Missouri and Georgia. In re Burns 90 Fed. 651; in re Gutwillig 90 Fed.
475; in re Curtis 91 Fed. 737; in re Smith 92 Fed. 135; in re Etheredge
92 Fed. 329; inre Severs 91 Fed. 366; in re Macon 112 Fed. 323.
The same position has been taken by the Supreme Court of the
United States as to both the former and to the present bankruptcy act.
Sturges v. Crowninshield 4 Wheaton 122; Tua Carrieri 117 U.S. 210; Butler
v. Goreley 146 U. S. 314.
The great weight of authority in-Pennsylvania is to the same effect.
As early as 1817 Tilghman, C. J. said, "It is contended that a state has
no power to pass a law on the subject of bankruptcy. There would be
great strength in this argument if Congress had exercised their power by
passing a bankrupt law, because then the uniformity which Congress was
authorized to establish would be broken in upon by the act of an individ-
ual state." In Beck v. Parker 65 Pa. 264, and Barber v. Rodgers 71 Pa.
364 the question whether the enactment of a bankruptcy law by Congress
ipso facto suspends the operation of the insolvent laws of the states was
expressly left undecided. To the same effect see Adan v. Decker 34
Super. 162.
In Shyrock v. Bashore 11 Phila. 565 the court after an exhaustive ex-
amination of all the authorities decides that the passage of a national
bankrupt act "ipso facto suspends the state laws upon the same subject."
Concerning the position taken in this case by the learned court below, to
wit, that the state may exercise jurisdiction under its laws until the
jurisdiction of the Federal courts has been called into exercise the court
said, "The following objections readily present themselves: (1) That if
the bankrupt law may be construed as providing that repugnant state.
laws on the same subject shall operate until the benefit of it is invoked,
Congress can hardly be said to have established uniformity on the sub-
ject throughout the United States, which must be done if Congress acts
at all on the subject. (2) It is difficult to perceive such an intention in
the bankrupt law. (3) This construction leaves the suspension of the
state law and the operation of the law of Congress dependent upon the will
of the debtor and his creditors. (4) This view may lead to embarrassment
by stopping proceedifigs in the state court in the midst after orders and
distributions made, that the bankrupt law and the courts acting under it
will not sanction.
In Com. v. O'Hara 6 Phila. 402 in a lengthy opinion the court held
that the national bankrupt law ipsojacto suspended the operation of the
state laws in all cases where the subject matter and the persons are the
same. And to the same effect is Tobin v. Trump 3 Brew. 288.
In Potts v. Smith Co. 25 Super. Ct. 206 it is held that the Penna. act of
1901 relating to insolvency is suspended by reason of the bankrupt act of
1898 and does not become operative as to persons and subjects to which
the Federal act-applies. To the same effect are Bank v. Glass 29 Super.
Ct. 125; Oppose & Morrison v. McKay 57 Pitts. 43; Rittenhouse Est. 30
Sup. 471. See also Charles v. Smith 29 Super Ct. 5 94.
In opposition to these cases the opinion of Judge Stewart in Hulls
Estate 25. C. C. 355 has been cited. In regards to this opinion it is suf-
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ficient to say that it cites no authorities for the position taken therein,
and that its author regretted "the exigency that prevents a fuller ex-
amination of the questions raised."
Zacharias v. Imperial Co. 11 Dist. 171 also holds that the act of 1901
is constitutional and not suspended. The reason assigned is that it is an
insolvent and not a bankrupt law. This is surely untenable. Even Judge
Stewart admitted that it was "essentially a bankrupt law." Similiar acts
have been held to be bankrupt laws by the United States Supreme Court
Boese v. Locke 108 U. S. 379.
This review of the authorities has convinced this court that the oper-
ation of the act of 1901 is suspended during the existence of the national
bankrupt act and that the provisions of the act of 1901, more particularly
sects. 31 and 16, have, therefore, no bearing upon the present case.
The fact that the act of 1901 is, as to each and all ofits provisions, sus-
pended during the existence of the act of 1898 does not render the assign-
ment by A ineffectual for every purpose. It is sufficient to pass title
from A to his assignee. It is good as between them and, in absence of
proceedings in bankruptcy impeaching the assignment, it is valid and ef-
fectual as against the creditors of A. If B were attempting to attach
a part of the estate assigned we would be compelled to decide against
him. (Beck v. Parker 65 Pa. 264; Boese v. King 108 U. S. 386.) But he is
not. A debtor may lawfully assign any part of his property. A deed
thus partial in its terms, would not operate upon the property not defined
in it. The debtor may, without specifying the articles not intended
to pass to the assignee, assign all his estate "except so much as may be
exempt from execution," or all his property, "saving and reserving, how-
ever, all benefit of any and all exemption laws" etc. Chitcoats App. 101
Pa. 22; Shaffer's Appeal 101 Pa. 45; Heckman v. Messinger 49 Pa. 465;
Bausman Ap. 90 Pa. 178.
If such a reservation has been made the proper method for a creditor,
* as to whom the exemption has been waived, to proceed is by attachment
or execution. In Myer's Appeal 78 Pa. 452 it appeared that Neil assigned
for the benefit of his creditors all his estate "reserving so much property
as the law of this Commonwealth exempts from execution, to the value
of $300, which is hereby reserved and to be set apart and appraised in a
manner provided by law * * and if said property cannot be set apart then
said amount is claimed and reserved out of the proceeds of said house and
lot when sold.' Afterwards Myers recovered a judgment against Neil on
a note waiving the exemption. It was held that Myers had no standing
to claim in the distribution of the fund assigned and that the waiver must
be asserted by execution or attachment against the reservation-that is
the goods or money set apart under the assignment and not passing into
the fund.
This case is on all fours with the case at bar.
Judgment reversed.
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STEWART vs. KELLAR
Unfenced Land-Trespass by Cattle-Liability of Owner.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Kellar owned a farm in one field of which he pastured his cattle.
Stewart owned an unfenced field of corn not far away. Kellar's farm
was well fenced but a gate opened from his field in which the cattle were.
McMillan, seeking to get Kellar into trouble, opened this gate one night
and the cattle wandered through it into the road and thence into Stewart's
corn-field. As a result, Kellar lost several cows and Stewart lost a lot of
corn. This is trepass by Stewart against Kellar for the injury to his corn.
HESS for Plaintiff.
CASE for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BUTLER, J.-The only question to be considered in this case is
whether an owner of a properly fenced field is liable for trespass commit-
ted by his cows on the unfenced land of another, such trespass being made
possible by an enemy of the owner of the cows maliciously opening the
gate of the fenced lot, and thus permitting the cows to wander in the
highway and into the unfenced land of the plaintiff. In other words, is an
owner of cattle bound at his peril to see that they do not stray from his
land and trespass upon the lands of another?
The only statutes in Pennsylvania relating to the subject of fences
are, first: The Act of 1700 which provides "that all corn-fields shall be
fenced with a fence five feet high" etc. If this were law to-day the de-
fendant could show as a defense to this action that the plaintiff by not
having his corn-field fenced according to the Act is not protected by law
from the trespass .omplained of in this action. But the Act of 1700, re.-
lating t) corn-fields being fenced was expressly repealed by Act of 1889,
and, there being no further statutes on the subject, the common law
must be reverted to, in order to determine the rights of the parties.
According to the common law rule, "if a man's cattle trespass upon
another's close, the owner of the animal is responsible for the trespass and
consequential damage, unless he can show that his neighbor was under a
duty to fence and had failed to do so. And it matters not whether the
animals be at the time in his own immediate care or charge, or in the
care of his servants, or in the custody of a stranger. In this last case the
stranger may be sued as well as the owner for the trespass. BUT, "if
my servant without my knowledge take my beasts and put them on
another's land, my servant is the trespasser and not I; for by his willful
dealing with the beasts without my authority, he gains a special property
in them for the time, and for this purpose they become his own beasts."
And also, "If a landowner who has land abutting upon a high-way neg-
lects to fence the land from the highway, so the cattle stray from the
high-road and injure his crops, he cannot treat the owner of the beasts as
a trespasser." Addison on Torts.
It would seem therefore that there are exceptions to the rule that an
owner of cattle is liable absolutely for their trespass and consequential
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damages: FIRST, where a third person without the knowledge of the
owner of the cattle puts them upon the land of another, and, SECONDLY,
where the land on which the trespass was committed abutted upon the
highway and was unfenced.
Both of these exceptions apply to this case. FIRST, while the third
party, McMillan, did not actually put the cattle upon the land of the
plaintiff, it was his desire to have them go upon the plaintiff's land, and
he chose a very effectual mode of attaining his desired object, so we may
with reason say that he constructively put them there. SECONDLY, al-
though it does not affirmatively appear that the plaintiff's corn-field abut-
ted upon the highway, it is safe to assume that it did, as it appears from
the facts that it was unfenced.
S nce the facts of this case come within the above stated exceptions,
it necessarily follows that the law applicable to these exceptions applies
also to this case, i. e., that the owner of the cattle cannot be considered
by the plaintiff, Stewart, as tile trespasser.
It is not for the court to instruct the plaintiff what his remedy is, if
he has any, but it is sufficient to say that this action will not lie.
Judgment is entered for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
We are constrained, with much reluctance, to reverse the judgment
of the learned court of common pleas. For many decades the law of
England and of Pennsylvania has imposed a liability for damage done by
trespassing cattle upon their owner without respect to his negligence.
"The owner," says Pollock, Torts, p 479, "is bound to keep them from
straying on the land of others at his peril." Brett J. is quoted in a note
as saying that "in the case of aninals trespassing on land, the mere act
of the animal belonging to a man, which he could not foresee, or which
he took all reasonable means of preventing, may be a trespass, inasmuch
as the same act, if done by himself, would be a trespass." The only
reason given, says Pollock, in the earlier books, " (as indeed it still pre-
vails in quite recent cases,) is the archaic one that trespass by a man's
cattle is equivalent to trespass by himself." Elsewhere, Torts, p. 333,
he says again: "Trespass by a man's cattle is dealt with exactly like
trespass by himself."
The same view of the law is given by Cooley, 2 Torts, p. 684: "The
common law made it the duty of every man to keep his cattle within the
limits of his own possessions. If he failed so to keep them, he failed in
duty, and when they strayed upon the land of another, the owner was
chargeable with a trespass. Nor did his liability for the mischief done
depend in any degree upon his personal fault, since, if the cattle actually
escaped from his custody, notwithstanding due care on his part, his
responsibility for the injury actually committed, by them, was the same
that it would have been had he voluntarily permitted them to roam at
large." "The liability," says Thompson J., "is not a question of negli-
gence, or want of due care on the part of the owner. "-Rossell v. Cot-
tom, 31 Pa. 525.
The owner divests himself of liability, if at all, only when he divests
himself of the control of the cattle, and they cause the damage while thus
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beyond his control. If, e. g., he has committed them to an agister under
a tontract, and they being thus in the agister's custody and control, do
the damage, the agister, not the owner, is liable in trespass, although,
says Thompson J., the owner may be liable in case. 31 Pa. 525. His
entire non-liability is asserted by several authorities.-2 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. 355; Cooley, Torts.
Kellar's cattle were in his control. They were grazing on his own
farm. Without his fault, the gate opening from the field into the high-
way was opened. Their straying proclivities meeting with ho obstruction,
tlhe cattle passed into the highway, and thence into Stewart's field. It
was the legal duty of Kellar to control their movements, and uncondition-
ally to keep them from Stewart's premises. He was not negligent. The
act of McMillan made possible the escape of the cows. These circum-
stances do not negative the duty.
In Noyes v. Colby, 30 N. H. 143, a cow belonging to A was taken from
the pasture by X, without the knowledge or consent of A, and driven
along the road for a distance, and then let go its own way. It strayed
upon B's land, doing injury there. A was held responsible. It issaid that
if X had driven it upon B's land, A would not have been responsible.
In that case, X had no wish or intention that the cow should get upon
another's land. In the case before us, McMillan had the wish, the hope,
that the cattle would make trouble for Kellar; that is, would commit an
actionable trespass somewhere. This difference we think uninfluential.
The fence law of 1700 would have made recovery by the plaintiff
impossible because of his failure to enclose his fields with fences at least
five feet high, of sufficient rails or logs. The repeal of that act by the
act of April 4th, 1889, P. L. 27, restored to him the remely that he
would have had at common law. The defendant is liable for the trespass
of his cattle, although the plaintiff's land was unfenced.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
